Things you need to know about KLCI Composite Index

1. What is KLCI Index, from the FTSE KLCI Index Factsheet
"Malaysia’s headline index, the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) is now enhanced and known as FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI. Part of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index Series, the 30 stocks tradable index is representative, liquid and transparent providing domestic and international investors with an enhanced index to access the Malaysian market."

2. The five years return (average per annum, I think is dividend excluded) of KLCI is not good, with data as of 29th November, the return equal to - 3.0%.

3. The estimated dividend yield for KLCI index is 3.53% (when the index is 1572.51)
This is comparable to the best fixed-deposit rate available in the market, but not good enough.

4. The estimated P/E ratio is 20.41, calculated based on

• 26th December 2019 data
• Excluded negative outlier (such as Axiata and Sime Darby plantation that has negative return)
• the stocks past 12 months earning
• Adjusted for the stocks %weightage in KLCI, if unadjusted then the average P/E is 25.42. 

In contrast, the S&P 500 P/E ratio is about 24 now. 

5. Price earning ratio measures the ratio of stock price to the annual earnings of the companies, lower P/E is usually better, KLCI historical P/E is somewhat around 17, this means with a P/E ratio of around 20.4, KLCI is currently overpriced. 

6. There are 11 individual stocks in KLCI that have a P/E ratio below the market average, 7 of them are the banking stocks (Public Bank, Maybank, CIMB, Hong Leong Bank & Financial Group, RHB, Ambank), the rest are Petronas Chemical (5183), Genting (3182), Genting Malaysia (4715) and Sime Darby Berhad (4197). 

7. To me, personally, I think the high P/E ratio of certain stocks is unjustifiable. For example, Nestle Malaysia (4707) has a P/E ratio of close to 50. This means if you invest in Nestle now, excluding the growth potential, you need 50 years to recoup your investment through corporate earning. And you will be amazed to see the company with little long term growth potential but have high valuation such as IHH (P/E around 51), Pressmetal (P/E around 37) and Maxis (P/E around 29). 

8. For those who like to see the full lists of estimated earnings, dividend, P/B, P/E, the yield for the 30 stocks on KLCI, see table below

Source Quoted:
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Factsheet, downloadable here

3069 Mega First Corporation Berhad (Undervalued)

The research note in Public Invest pretty much summarize what my current thought. Interesting readers can read it here. I just like to share my thought on the new project - Don Sahong Hydropower Project undertake by the company.

Few Key Notes:
1.  This is a hydro power plant with fairly reliable electricity output. Coupled with the fact that the PPA is of take or pay type. Revenue for the company will be fairly stable and predictable.

2. The actual selling price of the electricity per kwh is undisclosed. My guess will be $5c /kwh, based on the average unit cost in Laos in 2009. (source)

3. Once built up, the major component of the cost will be
a) yearly repayment to long term debt
b) Annual O&M cost, the most likely to go up. Estimate is about 2-2.5% of the total installation cost.
(Source)
c) Depreciation charge, assuming linear depreciation.
d) Corporate income tax, currently 24% in Laos.

The net cash flow to the company, will then be profit after tax + depreciation charge.

4. Financing Structure. MFCB average return on equity is about 10%, higher than the typical rate for long term corporate bond. Given the stable nature of its revenue stream, the best option is to finance large part of the project using short term and long term debt (USD bond if revenue is fixed in USD term). which can go up to 90% of the financing requirement.

Estimation Results:
I made a few set of assumptions on major factors that could affect the PV valuations, these factors include:
a) the total CAPEX of the project
b) Annual generated unit of electricty
c) Capacity degradation of the hydroplant, either due to change in river flow rate or aging of generator.
d) Unit price of electricity
e) Adjustment rate of electricty
f) Long term debt interest rate
g) Opex,

with assumptions and results as below picture.

I haven't run a sensitivity analysis yet but the bigger uncertainty will be on electricity unit sale price and loan interest rate. Nevertheless, based on the mid-case, it seems the current share price (RM 2.5) is a good bargain compared to the valuation you will get.

However, do be mindful that as one of its power plant PPA is expiring at end of 2017 (2018?), there will be period where Its profit & cashflow will dropped, before its picked up again.

Disclaimer
The data above was taken and calculated according to information supply from the company's announcement, quartery report and annual report available at the Bursa Saham website, there is some element of estimation in deriving the figure. 
The author bear no responsibilities of any buying/selling action of the investor, and any profit/loss incur by the investor.

The author had ownership in the stock covered.

Crash! Crash?

Last few trading days were particularly bad for Malaysia stock investors where, instead of enjoying the usual pre-budget rally, KLCI suffer one of its worst fall in the year and down to 6 month low.

There are a few explanation for the fall, in summary
- lack of growth momentum concern in Euro zone and China which expected to affect world's economy performance
- Outflow of capital from emerging market on expectation that US Fed will raise interest soon, thus stronger dollar anticipated.
- People suddenly feel that Bursa's stocks are overpriced? Especially O&G counters and Palm Oil counters?
- Rising inflation which will hindered consumer spending?
- Other factors, like bombing near bukit bintang, or potential outbreak of Ebola in US or Spain.

While some of doomsayers, like Mr. Tan Teng Boo maybe start laughing on " hah, i knew it" mood,  here are a few sign why KLCI shall not crash yet...
- Malaysia economy's growth rate remain healthy at 5%-6% range.
- Lower Crude Oil price actually good for economy growth.

My view is that KLCI had been bouncing around range of 1780 to 1890 for 2014.There are no particular strong reason why the index shall move up and down, current movement looks more like emotional base. As market sentiments are strong, we may see a wider swing to continue.

Hence, at current level of 1808.88 , there are equal chances that the KLCI index can go up, down, or remain flat.

How is ICAPITAL BIZ (5108) Performing?

The performance of ICAPITAL BIZ (the close end fund managed by Tan Teng Boo) had been lacklustre for the past three years, with compound rate of return averaging of 4.03% (calculated from their annual reports) compared to KLCI return of 9.53% (assume dividend yield of 3.2%). Its annualized return since inception in 19th October 2005 till 31st May 2014 remain impressive at 14.19%, this is significantly higher than KLCI annualized index return of 8.72% for the same period, and still higher than KLCI annualized total return of 11.92% for the same period (Total return = index return + dividend yield of KLCI stocks, average to be around 3.2% last year). 

Table 1: ICAPITAL BIZ annualized return compared with FBMKLCI 

(source : ICAPITAL BIZ annual report, here)

One of the investor blogger before me, AhYap had written some articles regarding ICAPITAL BIZ back in 2007 (here) and 2010 (here). I shall just continue on. 

The obvious reason why ICAPITAL BIZ's performance is lagging behind the benchmark (KLCI) for the past three years is their high level of Fund's Cash level. Mr. Tan and his management had been defending themselves with the following statement:

" What can the cash holdings potentially do to your Fund? Should the KLCI fall by 20%, the NAV of icapital.biz Berhad would drop only 9%, due to its current 55% cash holding. If the KLCI plunges 50%, its NAV would fall only 22.7%. This is the protection from its cash holdings. " 

Well, all i can say is the readers need to be aware that the reverse is also true. Cash holdings will give protection when market is falling, but cash market will hurt you also when market is rising. shall KLCI rise by 20%, the NAV of icapital biz will rise only by 9% due to its current 55% cash holding. Mr. Tan and his management had gone on with an illustration on how can they profit: 

"Table 4 below shows a scenario where we assume that the KLCI and the equity portfolio plunge equally by 50%. Again this example is merely for illustration purposes and is in no way a forecast or projection of future returns. Due to the cash holdings, the NAV drops only 22.7%...In such a situation, the cash assets will be deployed. Assuming an annual compound return of 15%, the NAV in year 6 will be 55% higher than in year 0 ..... In contrast, the KLCI will in year 6 be 16% lower than in year 0 (assuming its long-term past annual return of 11% for the KLCI)..."

Table 4: An illustration (source : ICAPITAL BIZ annual report, here)

Now, what if the reverse is happening, where instead of having a crash, KLCI continue its rising trend on 9.5% annualized total return as per past three years, and ICAPITAL BIZ continue its performance of 4% annualized total return as per past three years? Following table illustrates what will happen, where the investor sticking with KLCI will earn 30% more compared with investing with ICAPITAL BIZ.

The conclusion?

Mr. Tan and his management are currently relying on two skills to outperform the benchmark (KLCI):

i. Their ability to pick the stocks that will outperform market (stock picking skill)

ii. Their ability to time the market in order to buy low sell high (market timing skill). 

ICAPITAL BIZ current bid is that market will crash soon, which they act accordingly by hoarding more cash. It is too earlier to say whether their prediction/bid is correct or wrong, but here are my two cents:

i. History in stock market index movement tends to repeat itself but with less and less fluctuation in magnitude term. The lesser fluactuation (from index peak point to next lowest point during crash) is due to a) learned authority and regulator (the government and bank negara) in stabilizing the market during crash course, and b) more intelligent investors (especially institution investors like EPF and mutual funds) which will sell when they perceive the market is overprice, and start buying when the market is oversold. This means that, it is unlikely to see KLCI following crash course in 1998 where the index evaporated 76.7% from 1126.83 @ 3rd June 1997 to 262.7 @ 1st September 1998, It is also less likely to see the crash course in 2008 where the index evaporated 45% from 1516.22 @ 11th January 2008 to 835.17 @ 9th December 2008 (source)

ii. No news or major economic indicators indicating that Malaysia economy is going to hard-landing/market is going to crash soon. In 1998 we had the Asian Financial Crisis sparked by currency crisis of south-east asia countries, in 2008 we had the US. Housing Crash. As i predicted before:

"  It took at least three years for the sign of crash to be seen after US Fed raised policy rate starting June 2004. And we are still waiting for Fed to make its first move in raising the policy rate now, which will directly increase the borrowing costs and start slowing the economy (and housing market) down." 

iii. The market is definitely overprice now but the degree of overpricing still not reach dangerous level. Hoarding cash is a prudent move, but holding too much cash like 55% level, will hurt the performance of your portfolio. 

7060 New Hoong Fatt Holdings (Overpriced)

Preface Discussion
There are two ways to evaluate a company.

1. Evaluate the company by treating it as stable business. In this way, the performance of the company: the Return On Invested Capital (ROIC) will be pretty predictable through reading past financial statement. Any change of ROIC will not be sudden and can be detected through trend analysis. 

(See here for a discussion on important of ROIC)

2. Evaluate the company by treating it as a fast growing business. In this case, very large CAPEX is expected during the first few years of growing phase, where higher depreciation will results later. This type of company cannot be evaluate through studying the past financial statement. They can only be evaluated, by understanding the industry environment the company operated at for the next five to ten years, then predict if they can recoup from their initial Capital Investment. 

Earning for some types of the company , such as utilities, are fairly predictable. Just that some of the key information like Power Purchase Agreement, Detail CAPEX amount, future financial interest, quality of management to ensure reliable operation, long term issue affecting probability of the company are not generally available to public investors. 

Earning for the others, like Hotel & Leisure (such as Genting adventure in Singapore and Las Vegas), are however highly unpredictable. Which their share price should reflect a discount to compensate  for uncertainty that investor faced. 

Key Information For Analysis

Additional Info: Chairman and CEO are major shareholder. This is a typical family business company. 

Discussion

Major business activities by New Hoong Fatt Holding is in trading and manufacturing autovehicle parts. The company had expand its operation to oversea (like Thailand, China, Indonesia). However as revenue and profit trend stable, i will analyse it by treating it as stable business. 

Positive

1. Growing autovehicle market means growing demand for its part. 

2. Stable dividend payout. 

Negative

1. Stagnant Revenue trend despite high CAPEX. 

2. Fluctuation in profit

3. ROIC trending lower. 

Conclusion

Dividend rate of 4.2% is better than Fixed Deposit. But given the stagnant revenue, near negative ROIC for now, the company is overpriced. 

Disclaimer
The data above was taken and calculated according to information supply from the company's quartery report and annual report available at the Bursa Saham website.
The author bear no responsibilities of any buying/selling action of the investor, and any profit/loss incur by the investor.

New Hoong Fatt Holdings Bursa Website

3883 Muda Holding Berhad (Overpriced)

Key Summary

Although Muda Holding Berhad had an impressive dividend paying record, the annual capital expenditure required just to keep the revenue growing/remain the same every year resulted in a negative Return on Investment Capital (ROIC) , which is a strong sell signal. 

Before the analysis 

1. The myth of earning after tax number.

The earning after tax number reflect the earning on the capital employed by a company in a particular year. It takes into account the historical cost of asset deploy to generate the revenue (registered under depreciation/amortization) but do not consider the cost of maintaining the production capacity (ie, the replacement cost). As a result, a company that adopt aggressive recognition of depreciation/amortization accounting practice will have inflated earning at the end of useful life of property, plant and equipment. But that earning (often retained ) will not be transformed into real cash disposable by the owner as long as the company need to reinvest in order to stay in the business. 

As always, i will try to illustrate it with following examples. 

Case 1, 
Company A start with a fixed asset which cost = RM 10 million. The fixed asset has useful life of 10 years. Each year, after charging 1 million as depreciation cost, company A registered profit after tax of 1 million. 

Question: How much is the company worth now? 
Answer : Less than RM 10 million. Since the company will only generate return for 10 years ( assuming no reinvestment of property). The total return receive in nominal value by the owner of the company is RM10 million. Discounting the cost of capital ( the income forego by investing the same amount into Fixed Deposit ), the Present Value of the company will be less than RM 10 million.


Case 2, 
Now , supposed that instead of distributing the RM 1 million into shareholders fund, the company opted to retain the earning by reinvest it to maintain the production capacity of the company after 10 year. How much would the company worth now? 

Answer :  The company worth only the aggregate fair value of the property, plant and equipment and nothing more. Fair value is not equal to historical cost. Most often, manufacturing plant and equipment will sell at value far below their historical cost, while only land and building might registered an appreciation. 


Now, it can be shown clearly that in both case, the company net worth is less than the stated net asset value. The inflation, will raise the cost of replacement of property, plant and equipment, while imposing a tax on "manufactured" appreciation of land and building. A retain earning is not an earning unless it can produce market value more than that. 


2. The concept of ROIC, 

Taking into the cost consideration for the company to remain in business, Warren E.Buffet proposed a concept in reviewing the actual earning power of a company. 
Return on Investment Capital (ROIC) which is Owner Earning/Invested capital. 

owner earnings = (a) reported earnings 

 + (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, 

 - ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment

It should be noted that, in the financial statement, the direct cost of acquisition of property, plant and equipment will not reflect the total capitalized expenditures. In fact, most of the capital expenditure will be recorded as asset under capital work in progress item. 


The concept of ROIC will put company under rapid expansion program in disadvantage, but it nonetheless serve its purpose in indicating the real cost of expansion. 


The Key Parts.

	1 year	3 year	7 year
Price	0.785
NAV	2.069
ROE	0.029	0.065	0.054
EPS	0.056	0.116	0.087
PER	14.071	6.796	9.022
Dividend	0.025	0.025	0.024
ROIC	0.029	-0.048	-0.020
OEPS	0.056	-0.079	-0.033
POER	14.071	-9.988	-23.890

At initial glance, the ROE look unsatisfied but still in positive, the PER ratio and Price to book ratio shows that the share might be undervalued. However, after adjusting for owner earning item, the ROIC, OEPS all show negative number.

Not to mention, when the company is showing accounting profit after tax of RM26 million (including the effect of tax benefit ), the board of director take home a package of average RM 4.5 million.
One would wonder, whether the expansion of the company serve the interest of the management more, or the shareholder's interest more.


Disclaimer
The data above was taken and calculated according to information supply from the company's quartery report and annual report available at the Bursa Saham website.
The author bear no responsibilities of any buying/selling action of the investor, and any profit/loss incur by the investor.

Muda Bursa Saham Website

Poh Kong (5080) Pk TOMEI (7230)

Key Summary

Both shares trade at attractive price to earning ratio. TOMEI, having an International presence which expand rapidly during past few year, was recording declining net profit margin and ROE. Poh Kong, while having strong performance these past year, seemed to overpay its director.


Before the analysis 

The jewellery retailer industry seem to be a never-will-lost-a-cent kind of business. Poh Kong and TOMEI, the two industry leader, had never recorded a year with loss. Hence, the question left for the investor, is which one outperform the other. In order to do a comparable study, we need to single out the numbers that is affected by their size, ie : Total revenue, profit after tax, net earning per share. 

Hence, the ratios that can gauge the relative strength of the management team , would be ROE, Net Profit margin, Average Revenue per store  ( for major ) , and Fixed asset utilization factor (revenue/fixed asset), Sales/inventories ratio (minor consideration) . Other factors that may aid in the decision are dividend rate and  director effect (net profit / total director remuneration package).


The Key Parts.

Note:
* Poh Kong had undergo major share capital expansion, hence PER based on non-diluted earning per share before cannot give a true picture on companys earning power.
** TOMEI group has 70 retail outlet in Malaysia with 18 retail outlet overseas (7 in Vietnam, 11 in China) . Whether the overseas retail kiosk contribute the same revenue per store for TOMEI, is a subject worth exploring further.

The Good About POHKONG,
The net profit margin is better,
The current PER is more attractive.
It achieved a higher revenue per retail store.

The Good about Tomei.
Average Return on Equity is higher.
Asset utilization, revenue/inventory, director factor are all better.


In Conclusion
Both companies are distributing dividend at the rate comparable to the rate received from Fixed Deposit. The major exception is that, the FD rate fluctuate according to Bank Negara Policy, while for Both companies, with ROE well above 10%, you can expect your dividend rate (related to historical cost of purchase) will keep growing at foreseeable future.

The choice of choosing which company to invest is rather personal, but if we are confident in the future of gold and jewellery industry as a whole, we could consider a diversification by investing in both the largest and second largest player in the field.

Tomei Bursa Saham Link 
PohKong Bursa Saham Link

Msport Holding 5150 ( buy with caution ）

Key Summary

The price looks like a bargain to the point where one would wonder, why did anyone not seeing the 100 dollar notes lay on the floor. Even if the performance of the group turn out lower than expectation, a Ncash per share of RM 0.41 provide a safeguard to the investor's money, as long as the company dont start loosing money. 


Before the analysis 

1. Why did a PRC company opts to enlist on foreign stock market? 

The first is branding purposed. Having the company enlisted on public stock market, will give assurance to their business partner, while bringing better management practise and stricter internal control to the company. 

The second, enlisting is another way to acquire working capital in a reasonable cost. Especially useful in a time when obtaining bank loan for a non-GLC company is hard in China. 


2. Why did PRC companies usually retained large portion of earning after tax, despite low level (in term of ratio) of capital expenditure requirement, and high reserve capital? 

As i mentioned before, unlike other company in developed country, obtaining large amount of bank loan   is a much harder task for non-GLC companies in China. Taking an excerpt from my past article: 

This leaves the People’s bank of China, only one choice, control the total amount of credit. Unlike the western counterparts, china central bank can directly setting the amount of credit, instead of control it indirectly by regulating the money base. The China banking regulator commission will ‘suggest’ the total amount of credit that can be increase by the commercial banks, when the bank exceed the limit, the particular bank will be ‘punish’ by raising its deposit reserve ratio. The ‘target’ for total increment of credit this year is set to be 7.5 trillion RMB. [11] Since massive government infrastructure projects are still on going, the majority of the increment will likely flow to local governments or state-owned company.[12]  This will force the SMEs turn into private loans which bear interest rate as high as 100%. [13] Thus, view from the outside will see China still enjoying growth of 10% of GDP, but closer examination will reveal a worsening environment for SMEs that hire majority of the workforces. 

Hence, retaining a large portion of earning after tax has become a common practise for many PRC company. When market outlook remain positive, no corporate manager will want to pass on the expanding opportunity simply due to inadequate capital issues. 


3. Why are PRC companies are usually undervalued, even if their P/E ratio can go as low as 2 to 3? 

First, as mentioned above, the dividend payout ratio for majority of PRC companies are quite low. Hence, investor dont feel secured investing in company that wont give you anything in return for the first few year. 

Second, due to past bad reputation of PRC companies, either,some have revenue dropped shortly after their public listing activities, or, some even involve in fraudelant activities which costs investor their hard earned money. For more details , see here 

Thirdly, there have been past experience in Malaysia, and for PRC companies enlisted on foreign market, to delist the company when share price is vastly undervalued. The delisted price ( or share buyback price) were much lower than the intrinsic value of the company. Investors who, buying in anticipating share price will ultimately match the intrinsic value, end up like placing  money in a deposit box, receiving no or little dividend (due to low payout ratio practised by PRC).  No investor who emphasized on cash flow after reading " Rich Dad Poor Dad" will park their money into this company. 


The Financial part
All Figure below are in unit of RMB, computed based on closing price at 7th September 2012. 

Price	0.693
	1 year	3 year	7 year(all time)
net profit margin	0.1713	0.1950	0.2200
EPS	0.2554	0.3073	0.2368
dividend per share	0.0000	0.0577	0.0577
NAV	1.4879	1.4879	1.4879
NAV(cash)	0.8274	0.2758	0.1182
ROE	0.1716	0.2227	0.7547
PER	2.7140	2.2551	2.9269

3A Resource Berhad ( sell )

Key Summary

The price is not particularly attractive. The company don't seem to possess any price fixing power in the industry value chain.  Their management team are not acting in the best interest of the shareholders.


Before the analysis 

1.   What are the financial data that matter? 

For a growing company which have occasionally issued new shares in the past,  EPS growth rate  might be illusive.

A simple ( and extreme example ).
- Suppose a company has original ROE of 20% , and initial equity of RM100 million, with 100 million shares outstanding. The EPS now is RM 0.20.
- Suppose, as the P/B value is high, the company decided to sell additional 20 million shares for RM 5 each. Raising equities to RM 200 million, with 120 million shares  outstanding.
- Now , even if the ROE declined to 15%, the company will still recorded an  EPS of RM 0.25 ( 15% * RM 200 million / 120 million shares).  A 20% increase for EPS , doesn't show that the Management Team of the company actually performed better.

Hence, a trend of  ROE over five years, will show if the management team utilize the capital well.


2. What about others financial data, like revenue growth rate? 

The truth is that, a growing company can't grow forever, its growth will start to slow some point.

The problem is that, estimating the point where the company will start to slow, required extensive analysis and frequent updating information about :  the nature of the business the company operated in, the competitive advantages the company have ( patent, brand, government policy ) , the quality of the management team, and the future of the industry.

These kind of tasks often required massive amount of time and energy spent. Given that there are hundreds of stocks available in the main board, using a simpler tool to screen for potential undervalued stocks will save you quite a lots of time.

3. What about the Present Value formula, or Gordon Growth Model? 

A growth stock's present value evaluated using Gordon Growth Model is very sensitive to the rate of return ( or discount rate) demanded by the investors.

Added by the fact that you simply can't expect the initial growth rate be continued at the future, these are the reasons why Benjamin Graham will advised investors staying away from growth stock / or evaluating a stock like a growth stock.


The Key Parts.

	1 year	5 year average	All time
Price	1.13
Dividend	0.012	0.0116
Payout Ratio	0.3	0.2786	0.2786
NAV	0.511
Return on Equity(%)	7.9	11.94	11.29
Return on Asset(%)	5.6	7.54	6.87
EPS	0.040	0.061	0.058
PER	28.25	18.52	19.59

At initial glance, with KLCI's average P/E ratio at 18, any company with share price higher than NAV per share will require a current P/E ratio lower than 18 for equivalent risk premium existed. 3A's current P/E ratio, with price RM 1.13 and recent EPS RM 0.04, was 28.25, which is way higher than the market average. Even if assuming they can return to their average ROE of 12%, the adjusted PER of  18.52 for 5 years average, and 19.6 for all time average, are still below general market performances.

The company performed poorly these two years despite increasing revenue income. This showed they are unable to pass on the increase of production cost ( raw material price ) to their customers ( A sign of little price fixing power in their market ).

It is understandable that for a growing company, its dividend payout ratio will be low, and the investors won't expect high rate of return at this period. However , the Board of Director's determination to safeguard minority interest in the company is questionable, when they took home a total of  three million remuneration package, when the after tax profit is just fifteen million ringgit. Furthermore, the company announced a share buy back program recently, given the share price of the company are currently overvalued, this will overpay the departing shareholders at the expense of those who stay. Furthermore, a share buyback program, is an implicit admission that the current management team can't grow the returns further.

Conclusion
When a family business goes public, the Board of Directors formed by family members will tend to put family's interest above minority shareholder's. Hence, the investors need to demand higher rate of return than market's average. Unless the current P/E falls below 20 and long term P/E falls below 15 ( which indicated a price of RM 0.80-0.90), we should restrained ourself from any further analysis.


Other links
CWYEOH KLCI stock analysis
Bursa Saham Company Information