Tuesday, October 2, 2012

无关财富, 谈谈外汇储备这东西

这么说吧, 我们对外汇储备的有限知识是, 97年东南亚金融危机, 由于马来西亚没有足够的外汇储备来应对国际炒家的抛售,于是马币大幅贬值, 随之而来的股市暴跌,造成人们的财富缩水。


因此, 结论是外汇储备对维持一国的货币汇率很重要。

东南亚货币在97金融危机后的严重贬值, 反而给货币政策制定者意外发现货币被严重低估的好处。那就是,
吸引外资流入设厂, 本国产品在国际市场上更有竞争力,因此能生产出比自己能消费的还要多很多的商品, 进而从制造业开始, 创造工作机会,拉动经济增长。
我们称之为, 出口为导向的经济。 主要例子是, 中国, 马来西亚, 泰国, 印尼等。

那么, 外汇储备怎么来?
外资要进入某个国家, 比如说马来西亚好了, 它要在马来西亚买本地制造的商品, 只能使用本地流通的货币--零吉。
问题来了, 外资本身没有办法用实物换零吉(那等于是进口, 把东西拿到马来西亚去卖) , 他们能做的,是把手中有购买力的货币(比如说美金, 欧元), 然后拿到马来西亚国家银行, 或者商业银行里去换成零吉。
在这里要注意的是, 只有国家银行的外汇资产, 才是外汇储备。 而商业银行自己持有的外汇资产,不算外汇储备。

如果一国的外汇市场是自由浮动的, 那么在一个国家严重出超(出口大于进口, 贸易严重顺差)的情况下, 由于零吉的数量有限,于是在外资哄抢的情况下, 渐渐的一美金, 一欧元所能换的零吉会越来越少, 也就是说 零吉的汇率会升值. 假定马来西亚生产的货物以零吉为标价的价格不变,这意味着我们的货物在国际市场变贵了, 国际市场的货物对我们来说变便宜了。 于是出口会减少, 入口会增加,,马来西亚的国际贸易收支会趋向平衡。 然而这对制造业的就业来说,不一定是件好事

于是有些国家会实行固定汇率, 既不管国家的经济状况如何, 国家银行(中央银行)都会以固定的汇率去兑换零吉给美金持有者。 前面说过,如果汇率兑换是在商业银行发生的, 那么就不算国家的外汇储备。 可是在国家贸易出超的情况下, 马币的实际汇率 会升值, 这样的情况下,如果商业银行把到手的美金拿去国家银行的柜台兑换, 就能换到比市场更多的零吉。 同样道理,任何人如果把到手的美金拿到国家银行的柜台去兑换, 都能换到比市场上自由兑换更多的零吉, 于是大家都用美金和国家银行换零吉,我们的外汇储备, 就这样累积。

现在回头看看97年的金融风暴, 当马币的币值被高估的时候, 为了维持马币的高币值,国家银行愿意以一美金来收购2.5马币。 炒家们,甚至是商家发现用马币和国家银行换美金比较划算, 于是纷纷把钱(或者说借来的马币)拿到国家银行的柜台去换美金, 于是外汇储备急剧减少。同时, 由于我国没有美金的印刷权, 国家银行要应对前来兑换的民众,只有用实际上贬值的马币(假设是3零吉换1美金)在国际市场上兑换美金, 再用换回来的美金换给炒家以维持货币的汇率。 其结果,是加剧了外汇储备枯竭之余,更使国家银行面临亏损

国家银行面对的亏损, 不管是因为马币估值过高, 或是马币估值过低而发生的, 这亏损并不会凭空消失, 终究会要资产来偿还。国家银行创造资产的方式只有一种, 那就是印钞票。 印钞票的后果是什么? 通货膨胀。 所以不管币值高估还是低估了,都不是件好事。 只是因为通货膨胀的效果是隐形的, 而币值调整,不管是从高价滑落带来的国际购买力缩水, 或是由低价攀高带来的制造业的打击都是显形的,所以各国政府都在纷纷维持过高或过低的汇率。

出口拉动的经济成长实在吗? 再回头看, 当一个国家严重顺差的时候, 他做的东西, 其实是用自己千辛万苦生产出来的实物,换来一堆花绿绿的美金。 问题是美金这个东西不能吃,不能当衣服盖, 也不能当电脑用。 再加上现在美国发现只要多印美金,就能用美金拿到出口为导向的国家换来实实在在的货物。 这种不用劳作就能享受的交易实在太好康了, 导致他们欲罢不能。于是美金的价值一直在下跌,马来西亚辛苦劳作换来得绿纸,到头来发现堆积的green back ( 美元 )还不保值。。。。

多元化我们的外汇储备, 我们这么叫嚷着。 然而只要国家贸易顺差的现实不变, 不管我们最后换来的是美金, 欧元还是日元,储备货币会缩水的这个特点依然不会变。 关键还是回到促进进口, 也就是乘储备货币价值缩水前把钱用出去。 而促进进口的最佳方法,是让零吉汇率合理的跟随市场的步伐升值。

Chairman's letter 1987
Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix.  Most investors, of course, behave as if just 
the opposite were true.  That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change.  That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities.

The best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago
 
Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a 
fortress-like business franchise.  Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns. 
That makes no sense to us.  We neither understand the adding of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor the cutting of essential people or activities because profitability is shrinking.  That kind of yo-yo approach is neither business-like nor humane
The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way.  In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels. 

When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses flourish.
Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most businesses, allow us our flexibility.  First, market share is not an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the fattest.  Second, in many sectors of insurance, including most of those in which we operate, distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year.  Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely 
means people - does not result in intolerable costs.  In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term prosperity. 

We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we 
must pay.  We do not have in mind any time or price for sale.  Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate.  When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, 
and not even as security analysts. 

Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it.  A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well.  This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities.  It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided.  However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky.  Our conclusion:  Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.

Chairman letters 1988
 
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire - a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

Chairman letters 1989

First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new "corrected" rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made
combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.

Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity.

we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached intelligently.

Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents

To these issuers, zero (or PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing

Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.

Chairman letters 1990

The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News - though all remain fine businesses.

"institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so,

Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.
Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buy

Chairman letters 1991

An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation.
The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.

     In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With
superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike
a franchise, can be killed by poor management